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Abstract 
In the current highly interconnected computing environments, users 
regularly use insecure software. Many popular applications, such as Netscape 
Navigator and Microsoft Word, are targeted by hostile applets or mali- 
cious documents, and might therefore compromise the integrity of the 
system. Current operating systems are unable to protect their users from 
this kind of attacks, since the hostile software is running with the user's 
privileges and permissions. 
We introduce the notion of the SubOS, a process-specific protection 
mechanism. Under SubOS, any application that might deal with incom- 
ing, possibly malicious objects, behaves like an operating system. It views 
those objects the same way an operating system views users-it assigns 
sub-user id's-and restricts their accesses to the system resources. 
Keywords: Secure systems, capabilities, process-specific protection. 
1 Introduction 
Many irslportant applications, such as mailers, m7eb browsers, word processors, 
etc., have rrlany of the characteristics of operating systenis. In particular, they 
accept requests fro111 a variety of mutually-suspicious sources. grant different 
permissions based on the source (or other attributes, such as a cryptographic 
token), a11d ~riediate access to  assorted resources. But applicatioris are poorly 
suited t o  this task. For exarnple, they have t o  implenierit file access restrictions 
by ~natching file nanies against assorted patterns. History shows, however, that  
tha t  approach is fraught with danger (i.e., CERT .Advisories CA:98-04 and 
CA:97-03). Real operating systems, which bind permissions t o  the protected 
objects, rarely have many problems like that .  
In this paper we irltroduce the riotiorl of a sub-operating systern (called 
SubOS hereafter). A SubOS is an  applicatios~ that  might have t o  operate 011 
u~itrusted objects. By the term tintlusted object we refer t o  any ir~conling file 
t o  our systerri, such as a Word docurr~er~t received i11 the mail, a postscript file 
dowrl-loaded from some ftp site, or a Java applet that  a browser ~riight load fro111 
a Web page. These applications use operating syste~ri protection ~rieclia~lis~ris 
to irnplerr~e~it their own. 
More precisely, applications that "touch" possibly malicious objects, like the 
ones listed above, will 110 lor~ger maintain the users privileges, but will rather 
get restricted access riglits to  the underlying resources. Figures 1 arld 2 display 
the differences of a regular, and a SubOS enabled operating system. 
Figure 1: User applicatio~is executirig 011 an operating system rnai11tai11 tlie user 
privileges, allowing the111 al~riost full access to tlie underlying operating syste111. 
~pplications 
The paper is orga~~ized as follows. 111 Section 2 we discuss the motivation 
behirid this work. 111 Sectio~l 3 we present tlie desigri and irliplenientatiorl details 
of a SubOS-capable OpenBSD [Ill system. 111 Sectiori 4 we discuss work that 
is related to  SubOS, arid finally we co~lclude i11 Section 5 .  
2 Motivation 
,4 ~lu~rlber of trends in co~riputirig are fueli~~g the need for a more flexible, yet 
stricter security rriodel in operating syste~ris. 
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With the growth of the Internet, excha~lge of ir~for~natior~ ver wide-area net- 
works has become essential for both applicatio~is a ~ i d  users. Modern applica- 
tioris often fetch help files and other data over the World Wide Web. In extreme 
cases, like sorrie flavors of the BSD UNIX operating system, even wllole oper- 
ating systerns i~istall and upgrade themselves over the network. However, the 
~riost coInrnon case is electro~~ic ~riail. Users regularly receive 111ai1 from uriknown 
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Figure 2: Under SubOS enabled operating systems user applicatiorls that 
"touch" possibly malicious objects no longer 111ai11tain the user access rights, 
and only get restricted access to  the u~iderlying systerrl. 
~pplicationr 
Operating System 
sources wit11 a ~iu~rlber of possibly rrlalicious attacl~~nerlts. The attached docu- 
ments use vulnerabilities i11 the helper applicatio~ls that are invoked to process 
them, which in turn could corrlpro~rlise syste~rl security. The need for connec- 
tivity and exchange of i11formatio11 eve11 at this rrlost basic level is therefore a 
major threat to  security. 
It is also the case that see~ningly inactive objects like Web pages or e-mail 
Irlessages are very ~nuch active and potentially dangerous. One exa111ple is 
JavaScript prograIrls which are executed within the security co~~ tex t  of the page 
with which they were down-loaded, and they have restricted access to other 
resources withi11 the browser. Security flaws exist i11 certain Web browsers that 
per~r~i t  JavaScript prograrrls to  rnonitor a user's browser activities beyo~ld tlie 
security context of the page with which the prograIri was dow~lloaded (CERT 
Advisory Ck97.20). It is obvious that such behavior autonlatically colnpro- 
~nises tlie user's privacy. 
ilnother exa~nple is the use of Multipurpose 111terrlet Mail Exte~lsio~ls (MIME). 
The MIME for~nat permits e~nail to include erlhanced text, graphics, and au- 
dio in a standardiaed and i~~ter-operable manIier. Metamail(1) is a package 
that i~rlple~rle~its MIME. Using a configurable mailcap (4) file, metamail (1) 
deter~rliries how to treat blocks of electronic   nail text based on the content as 
described by e~riail headers. -4 conditiorl exists i ~ i  metamail (1) in wl~icli there 
is i~~sufficient variable checking i11 soIrle support scripts. By carefully crafting 
appropriate Iliessage headers, a sender can cause the receiver of tlie Irlessage to  
execute a11 arbitrary co~rlrna~ld if the receive1 processes the Inessage usi~lg the 
mailcap (4) package (CERT -4dvisory C.4:97.14) [lo]. 
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2.2 Application Complexity 
But the problem is deeper than obvious forms of mobile code. Given the in- 
creasingly complex enviro~iment presented to  many applicatiorls, we assert that 
these applications have many of the cliaracteristics of operating systems, and 
should be impler~iented as such. 
Even siniple HTTP requests return a conlplex object, wherein the rernote 
side tells the local browser what to  do, up to  and including a request to run 
ce r t a i~~  applications. Print spoolers have to check file access permissions. Elnail 
can be delivered directly to programs. Web servers have to run scripts, often 
via an interpreter, while denying direct access to the interpreter and perhaps 
ensuring that one script does not access or ~r~odify the private data of another 
script. All of these applications sllould worry about resource co~isu~nption. And 
these, of course, are the characteristics of operating systems. 111 fact, arbitrating 
access to  various objects is Inore or less the definition of what an operating 
systerrl does. 
However, re-in~plenienting an operati~~g syste~r~ with each new applicatio~i 
would be extreme. Instead, our goal is to add sufficient functionality to an 
existing syster~~ so that applicatiorls can rely on the base operating system to 
carry out its ow11 particular security policy. That security policy. in turn, can 
reflect its ow11 particular needs arid its degree of certainty as to the identity of 
user S. 
2.3 Inadequate Operating System Support 
The lack of flexibility in modern operating syste~ns is one of the main reasons 
security is compromised. The UNIX operating system, in particular, violates the 
principle of least privilege. The principle of least privilege states that a process 
should have access to the smallest ~lurnber of objects necessary to accor~iplish a 
give11 task. UNIX only supports two privilege levels: "root" and "any user". 
To overcolrle this sliortcomi~lg, UNIX, can grant temporary privileges. ~ia~rlely 
se tu id(2)  (set user id) and setgid(2)  (set group id). These co~rl~nands allow 
a program's user to gain the access rights of the program's owner. However, 
special care rrlust be take11 any tirrie these primitives are used, and as experience 
has showri a lack of sufficient cautiori is often exploited [12]. 
.41iother technique used by UNIX is to change the apparent root of the file 
syste111 using chroot (2). Tliis causes the root of a file syste~ri hierarchy visible 
to  a process to be replaced by a subdirectory. One such application is the 
f tpd(8)  daemori: it has full rights in a safe subdirectory, but it ca1111ot access 
anytlii~lg beyond that. This approach, however, is very limiting, and in the 
particular exa~rlple coninlands such as Is (1) become unreachable and have to  
be replicated. 
These ~neclianis~r~s are inadequate to handle the coniplex security needs of 
todays applications. This forces a lot of access co~itrol arid validity decisio~~s t o
user-level software that runs with the full privileges of the invoki~lg user. Appli- 
cations such as mailers, Web browsers, word processors, etc., beco~rie responsible 
for accepting requests, granting per~rlissiorls and managing resources. All this 
is what is traditionally done by operating systerrls. These applicatio~a, because 
of their complexity as well as the lack of flexibility in the underlying security 
rnechanisrns, possess a rmmber of security holes. Examples of such problems are 
numerous, including macros i11 Microsoft Word, JavaScript, malicious Postscript 
documents, etc. 
We wish to offer users flexible security mechanisms that restrict access to  
systern resources to the absolute nlimirrlurrl necessary. 
3 The SubOS Architecture 
3.1 What is SubOS? 
SubOS is a process-specific protectiorl mecharlis~n. Under SubOS any appli- 
cation (e.g. ghostscript, perl, etc.) that might operate 0x1 possibly malicious 
objects (e.g. postscript files, perl scripts, etc.) behaves like an operating sys- 
tem, restricting their accesses to system resources. We are going to call these 
applications SubOS processes, or sub-processes in the rest of this paper. The 
access rights for that object are deterrr~ined by a sub-user id that is assigned to 
it when it is first accepted by the system. Tlle sub-user id is a si~nilar notion to 
the regular UNIX user id's. 111 UNIX the user id deternlines what resources the 
user is allowed to have access to, in SubOS the sub-user id determines what re- 
sources the object is allowed to have access to. The advantage of using sub-user 
id's is that we can identify iridividual objects with an immutable tag, whicll 
allows us to  bird a set of access rights to  them. This allows for finer grain 
per-object access control, as opposed to per-user access control. 
The idea becon~es clear if we look at the example shown in Figure 3. Let us 
assume that our untrusted object is a postscript file foo.ps. To that object we 
have associated a sub-user id, as we will discuss in Section 3.3. Foo.ps initially is 
an inactive object in the file systern. While it rerrlairls inactive it poses no threat 
to  the security of the system. However the rrlorrlent gs(1) opens it, and starts 
executi~ig it's code, foo.ps becorrles active, a~ id  auto~riatically a possible danger 
to the system. To comtairl this threat, the applications that open untrusted 
objects, inherit the sub-user id of that objects, arld are hereafter bound to the 
permissio~~s and privileges dictated by that sub-user id. 
Tlle advantages of our approach becorrle apparent if we consider the alter- 
native nletllods of ensuring that a ~nalicious object does not harrn the syste~n. 
Again using our postscript exa~riple we can execute foo.ps inside a safe inter- 
preter that will limit its access to the urlderlying file syste~n. There are however 
a rlurrlber of exarriples on how relying on safe languages fails [I@]. We could 
execute the postscript i~it,erpreter inside a sandbox using chroot (2), but this 
will prohibit it from accessir~g font files that it might need. Firially we could 
read the postscript code and make sure that it does not include arly nlalicious 
co~r~rrlar~ds. but this is impractical. 
Our rrletl~od provides trarlsparericy to  the user a~ id  increased security sir~ce 
File 
f0o.ps 
sub-user id 
Process 
gv foo.ps 
sub-user id 
Figure 3: In the left part of tlie Figure we see an object, in this case a postscript 
file foo.ps, witli its associated sub-user id. The rrlorrient the gliostscript applica- 
tion opens file Foo.ps, it tur~is  into a SubOS process arid it inherits the sub-user 
id that was associated with the uritrusted object. From now 011, tliis process 
has the perniissio~ls and privileges associated wit11 this sub-user id. 
each object has its access rights bound to its identity, preve~iting it fro111 liar~r~ing 
the syste~~i .  
3.2 Where should SubOS be Implemented? 
The most i ~ r ~ p o r t a ~ ~ t  design decisio~i s where we should add the SubOS fum- 
tionality. The two possible answers are user level and kernel level; each has its 
advantages and disadvantages. 
.4 user level approach would require each applicatio~~ of interest to  be li~lked 
with a library that will provide tlie required security ~rieclianis~~~s. Tliis has 
the advantage that it is operatirig systerrl-iridepe~ide~it, and so does riot require 
any changes in tlie kernel code. However sucll a solution requires rewriting tlie 
applicatior~ i11 such a way as to use the security ~r~echa~iis~ris. Since there are a 
lot lriore applicatio~is than operating systerns, this approach is 11ot scalable and 
also   no re likely to have i~r iple~~ie~~tat ion errors. 
An alternative user level i~r~pler r~e~i ta t io~~ would be silrlilar to that take11 by 
[6].  Processes that  night pose potential danger to  the systerri have tlieir syste111 
calls truced, usi~ig ptrace(2) or a si~rlilar facility. Using this approach, the 
applicatiori runs until it perfor~ns a systeIri call. At this point, it is put to sleep 
and a tracing process wakes up. The tracing process determines which system 
call was attempted. along witli the argurrlents of the call. It can then deter~riine 
whether to allow or deny tliis syste~rl call based on policies set by either tlie user 
or the ad~rii~~istrator. 
For a kernel level approach, we would need access to the operating system 
source code. Tliis restricts our prototype to ope11 source operating systems like 
BSD and Li~iux. ' However there is 110 other constraint li~riiting us to UNIX 
like operatirig syste~ns, and si~r~ilar i~nplerne~itatioris are possible for operating 
systerns like Microsoft Windows. The rriain advantage of this approach is that 
tlie additional security ~~iecha~iisrris will be large transparerit to the applications. 
Specifically, although the applications may need to be aware of the SubOS struc- 
ture, they will not need to worry about access control or program containment. 
3.3 How does SubOS enforce its Security Mechanisms? 
As we ~nentioned earlier, every tiirie the syste~ri accepts an incorriing object it 
associates a sub-user id with it, deperiding on the credentials the object carries. 
The sub-user id is pern~a~~er~t ly  saved iri tlie Inode of the file tliat holds that 
object, which is now its i~rirriutable identity in the system and specifies what 
perrnissio~is it will have. It has esser~tially tlie sarne functior~ality as a UNIX 
user id. One can view tliis as the equivalent of a user logging in to the system. 
Figure 4 shows the equivalence of the two n~ecl~a~~isrris. In the top part of 
the figure we see tlie regular process of a user Bar loggi~lg i11 a UNIX systeni Foo 
a ~ i d  getting a user id. 111 the same way, objects tliat e~iter the system tllrougl~ 
ftp, mail, etc., "log in" and are assigned sub-user id's based on their (often 
cryptographically-verified) source. 
1-1 \I,ogin User Bar 1 
7 Password UNlX password 
I user id I 
Host Foo 
ftp, mail, Object Bar.{ps,html, ,..) 
Web, etc. 
Password Cryptographic Token 
4 sub-user id 1 
Figure 4: Iri tlie top part of tlie Figure we see the regular process of a user Bar 
logging in a UNIX system Foo and getting a user id. 111 the same way objects 
that enter the systerri tlirougli ftp, ]nail, etc., "log in" using a cryptographic 
token, arid are assigried sub-user id's. 
To test the fumctio~iality of our current prototype we ~nodified a  nailer, 
mh(i), to  take advantage of the SubOS architecture. To do this we extended 
'Sometimes, operating systems are structured to permit easy additions to the kernel, even 
without source code availability. 
7 
mh(1) to i~rlple~nent a login-like ~rieclla~~is~ri. Depending on the source of the 
message-ideally, this should be cryptographically verified--mh(l) will attach 
a sub-user id to  that file wlie11 it saves it. Mh(1) assigns sub-user id's using a 
file, similar to  the UNIX /etc/passwd, that ~natches e-mail addresses to  id's. 
Sirr~ilar inlplementations are possible for other applications, like f t p ( l ) ,  or 
Web browsers. 
3.4 What should SubOS Protect? 
The SubOS ~nechanis~ris should protect the various resources of the users COIII- 
puter froni viruses, Trojan Horses, worms, etc. In order to do so, it should 
~rlonitor the creation of network connection, accesses to the file system, execu- 
tion time of processes and allocation of physical memory, that might result fro111 
rr~alicious code in untrusted objects. 
3.4.1 Process-related Controls 
The Iriost basic operation supported by SubOS is the inl~eritance of the sub- 
process id from an inactive file syste~ri object to a run~ii~ig process. To accorn- 
plish this we extended the open(2) system call. When it is used on objects that 
coritai~l sub-user id's, it copies the sub-user id to  the proc structure of that 
process (Figure 3).  At that point the process becornes a SubOS process bound 
to that sub-user id. 
It is crucial that a sub-process can never "escape" its sub-process status. To 
enforce this, whenever a sub-process forks and execs, the identity is inherited 
by the child process. To achieve this we extended the f ork(2) and exec(2) 
syste~rl calls to have created processes inherit tliat status. Furtlierrnore we 11iod- 
ified the c rea t  (2) syste~ri call, so that any files created by sub-processes have 
the sub user id of the creator assigned in their Inode. Finally sub-processes are 
not allowed to execute setuid prograIris, to e~lforce this we block the setuid re- 
lated ( se tu id(2) ,  se teu id(2) ,  se tg id(2) ,  setegid(2)  system calls i ~ i  the 
kernel. 
It is not clear that tliat is the right choice. However, UNIX has traditionally 
had trouble when setuid prograxns invoked other setuid programs. To give just 
one historical exar~lple, in the days wlle11 the mkdir(2) call was inlple~rie~lted 
by executing a setuid-root program, subsyste~ris that were therriselves setuid 
had trouble creating directories. 
3.4.2 Controlling Network Connections 
The way SubOS processes protect against urlauthorized network use is by fil- 
tering the network related syste~rl calls, using a firewall-like nleclia~iis~n. To do 
that it uses a list of firewull entries as shown in Figure 5. 
By default a SubOS process is not allowed to create network con~iectio~ls. If 
we want to allow specific SubOS process to  use the network we need to add a 
s t r u c t  FWE C 
i n t  subp-pid; 
i n t  hos t ;  
i n t  por t  ; 
>; 
Figure 5: Firewall entry. 
firewall eritry in tlie kernel specifyi~ig the sub-user id, the host it is allowed to 
connect to, and tlie port. 
I~riple~rienti~~g policies sir~~ilar to  Java's-that a host can cori~iect back to tlie 
host the applet was origi~ially loaded from-requires Iriore bookkeeping at  the 
application level. Specifically, sorrie database niapping sub-user ids to  network 
policies rriust be maintained. While policies are always necessary, the actual 
per~riission bits are maintained in the file system for file accesses. 
-4 practical implerrielitation would require co~isiderable attenti011 to policies, 
iricludi~lg wild cards for port numbers. rietwork masks for the host, etc. It might 
also be desirable to include certain known-safe local host/port cornbir~atioris. 
For example, we may wish to permit opean access to  a local DNS proxy, for 
safe IiaIIie resolution. On the otlier hand, wide-open access to  a real rlarrie 
server rrlight per~nit lie co~~trolled process to map local domains, which may be 
undesirable. 
Wlieri a SubOS process enters the kernel or1 a network-related systeIrl call, 
the firewall entry list is traversed and if the right permissions are fourld tlie 
syste~ri call is allowed to continue; otherwise we return with an error indicator. 
3.4.3 Controlling File System Accesses 
In order for the SubOS to restrict file syste~ri accesses we i~itroduce the rlotion 
of a view. Tlie view refers to tlie per~riissioris a sub-process has to parts of the 
directory tree. Sub-processes don't use tlie per~riission bits that are rior~nally 
used by processes (user, group, otlier). Rather, they have their ow11 per~r~issioris 
that are defined in a corifiguration file, wliicli tlie user or the ad~rii~iistrator 
is responsible for ~naintaining (Figure 6). This is very much like chroot (2) 
but rrlore like pruning the directory tree of tlie file system than setting a new 
root. 111 tlie example i11 Figure 6 both sub-processes are allowed to execute 
cor~i~r~ands cp (1) and Is ( I ) ,  which are typical utilities i11 /bin,  arid both have 
full access rights to /tmp. However each one has it's own private subdirectory 
under /home/f oobar/ . netscape. 
Tlie exte~ided per~riissiori bits are added in lists in tlie Inodes of tlie files 
specified in the co~ifiguratiori file. Every time the kernel identifies a file systeni 
access origi~lati~ig from a sub-process, it uses those permissiori bits instead of 
tlie 11or1ria1 bits set for user, group or other. 
For exan~ple, looking at Figure 6, the inode for /home/f oobar/ .  netscape 
will have ari ACL witli two entries, for sub-user id's 1024 arid 1025 arid execute 
Subp-pid Path Permissions 
# allow execute access to the commonly used commands 1s and cp 
1024,1025 / execute 
1024,1025 /bin execute 
1024,1025 /bin/ls execute 
1024,1025 /bin/cp execute 
# allow full access rights to the temporary directory /tmp 
1024,1025 /tmp read write execute 
# give each sub-process full access rights 
# to it's own subdirectory 
1024,1025 /home execute 
1024,1025 /home/foobar execute 
1024,1025 /home/foobar/.netscape execute 
1024 /home/foobar/.netscape/sub1 read write execute 
1025 /home/foobar/.netscape/sub2 read write execute 
Figure 6: Example permissions file. This file holds the perrriissio~is that SubOS 
processes with sub-user id's 1024 and 1025 liave, in tlie file hierarchy. 
perniissions for both. However tlie inode for /home/f oobar/ .netscape/subl 
will only have an entry for sub-user id 1024. If the sub-process wit11 id 1025 tries 
to access /home/f oobar/ .netscape/subl, the kernel will first identify that tlie 
access is being made by a sub-process, and then follow tlie ACL 011 the inode 
of /home/f oobar/ .netscape/subl to find whether or not it should per~rlit the 
operation. 111 this case of course it will fail, since 1025 has IIO pern~issio~is for 
that file, and the default behavior if no per~~iissions are specified is deny. 
3.4.4 Controlling CPU Consumption 
Sub-process execution time is nlomitored so that ~rlalicious code does not liarn- 
per the smooth operation of tlie systeni. Sub-processes liave no access to  the 
setpriority(2) or setrlimit (2) syste111 calls, prohibiting t l~e~r i  f o111 execut- 
ing at a higher priority than the parent process and lirriiti~ig the amount of 
cpu ti~rle they are allocated. Furthermore every time a sub-process forks, its 
allocated cpu tirr~e (RLIMIT-CPU) is divided by two, e~~suring that it ca111lot 
execute forever. There are a number of niore elaborate cpu scheduli~ig tecli- 
~iiques, but they are beyond the scope of this work. 
3.4.5 Controlling Memory Allocation 
As with cpu time allocatio~i, the amount of resident Inerrlory data of sub- 
processes is also controlled. This is done by using the RLIMIT-RSS field of 
the rlimit structure in the kernel. We use tlie sarrie approach as above, reduc- 
ing tlie amount of perniissible resident nierrlory by half every ti~rie a sub-process 
forks. Sirice setrlimit (2) calls are not perrnited, we protect against rrialicious 
code that attacks the merriory subsysterri. 
3.5 Sub-users 
111 order for a SubOS to be effective, different sub-user ids 111ust be assigned 
to different protection domains. Just how this is done depends on the the 
application and on how the file has arrived 011 the local system. 
For e-mailed files, the senders identity is used to  select the sub-user id. That 
is, if ernail arrives twice from the same user, any content will be executed using 
the sarrle sub-user id. (Naturally, such mail should be digitally signed.) Mail 
fro111 a previously-unknown user, or mail that cannot be assigned with enough 
confidence to a particular sender, receives a new sub-user id. 
For Web browsers, finer-grained protection is desirable. Each site visited 
is assigned its ow11 sub-user id, thus preventing one site fro111 interfering wit11 
a~lother's content. This could, for exa~nple, have prevented the "F'ra~ne Spoof" 
bug in Internet Explorer (MS98-020). 
3.6 Accessing Multiple Objects 
So far we have assumed that sub-processes will operate on only one object at a 
t i~ne. However it is possible for a sub-process to open r~~ultiple objects, each with 
its own sub-user id. We are currently in the process of i~nplementirlg support for 
this case. and we will describe our design. When a sub-process opens arlother 
object co~ltairlirlg a sub-user id it inllerits that id, and tlie new permissions are 
those of the iritersectio~l of the individual per~nissio~ls. 
This is easily accomplisl~ed i11 the case of cpu and Inemory allocation, the 
new sub-process will have the nlini~nurrl of the two for allocated IneInory and 
cpu time. 111 tlie case of network and file systerri access, any request is denied 
urlless it is allowed by the pernlissio~ls of sub-user id's. 
4 Related Work 
The area of operating systerll security is a field that has received a great deal 
of attention, and has been researched extensively. However, the ever-irlcreasirlg 
derrlarld and need for cornmunicatiorl and openness has put new strains on 
operatirlg systerrls. Corn~nunicatio~l erviron~rlents like the Internet require us to 
solve a whole new set of proble~ns that researchers have just recently started to  
address. In this section we focus our attention to  work that is directly related 
to  ours. 
There are several rnetliods for intrusio~i prevention in operating systerrls, 
ranging fro111 type-safe languages [15, 17, 23, 8, 71, fault isolation [21] arid code 
verification [IS], to  operating syste~n-specific per1rlissio11 ~nechariis~rls [16] and 
systeni call irlterceptio~l [2, 5 ,  6, 11. 
Capabilities and access control lists are the most corrlrrion ~r~ecl~a~lisrns op- 
erating systems use for access control. Such rnecl~a~~isms expand the UNIX 
security   nod el and are i~nplemented in several popular operating systelns, such 
as Solaris and Windows NT [3, 41. However they offer no protection for the user 
against prograIIls owned by the user, which Inay contain errors, Trojan Horses, 
or viruses. 
The traditional Orange Book-style syste~ns offer protection against violation 
of security levels by nlalicious programs. But there is no barrier to  attacks on 
files at the current security level, nor to attacks at  that security level over the 
network. For exaniple, a Top Secret wonn can would still be able to spread, 
though it would only be able to infect other Top Secret-rated systems. 
A different approacl~ relies 011 the notion of syste~r~ call interception, and 
its used by systems like TRON [2], MAPbox [I], Software Wrappers [5] and 
Ja~lus [6]. TRON and Software Wrappers enforce capabilities by u s i ~ ~ g  system 
call wrappers co~rlpiled into the operating systerrl kernel. The syscall table is 
111odified to route control to the appropriate TRON wrapper for each syste~n 
call. The wrappers are responsible for ensuring that the process that invoked 
the syste~n call has the necessary permissions. The Janus and MAPbox sys- 
te~rls ir~lplenlent a user-level syste~n call interceptio~~ ~nechanism. It is aimed 
at  confini~~g helper applicatio~ls (suc11 as those launched by Web browsers) so 
that they are restricted i11 their use of system calls. To acco~rlplisli this they 
use ptrace(2) and the /proc file system, which allows their tracer to register a 
call-back that is executed whenever the tracee issues a systenl call. These sys- 
te~ris are the most related to our work; however, our syste~n differs in a major 
point. We view every object as a separate user, each with its own sub-user id 
and access rights to  the system resources. This sub-user id is attached to every 
incoming object when it is accepted by the system, and stays with it throughout 
it's life, n~aking it i~npossible for rrlalicious objects to escape. 
The rnethods that we ~ner~tioned so far rely 011 the operating system to 
provide with sonle sort of nlechanis~n to e~lforce security. There are, however, 
approaches that rely 011 safe languages, [14, 15, 20, 13, 91 the Ir~ost coInmon 
example being Java [17]. In Java applets, all accesses to unsafe operations ~rlust 
be approved by the security manager. The default restrictions prevent accesses 
to the disk and network con~~ections to co~nputers other than the server the 
applet was down-loaded from. Our systenl is not o~lly restricted to a 1i111ited set 
set of type safe languages. We can secure any process run~lirlg on the system 
that has touched sorrle u~ltrusted object. 
Code verificatior~ is another technique for e~lsuring security. This approach 
uses proof-car7yiriy code [18] to de~~io~istrate  the security properties of the object. 
This means that the object needs to  carry with it a for~nal proof of its properties; 
this proof can be used by t.he systerrl that accepts it to  ensure that it is not 
malicious. Code verification is very limiting since it is hard to create sucll 
proofs. Furthermore, it does 11ot scale well; i~rlagirle creating a for~rlal proof for 
every Web page. 
All the above ~rlecha~lisrrl deal with the security issues. There is, however, 
the Quality of Service (QoS) [19, 221 aspect whicli we do not address directly 
in this paper. Many attacks will take up syste~n resources but might not ha r~n  
data. The 111ost corrl~rlo~i issue is CPU scl~eduli~lg. There is a lot of research 
that addresses CPU allocatio~~ to ensure fair CPU access for all running pro- 
cesses. Our SubOS uses the simple ~netllods described in Section 3.4 to ensure 
fairness and a srnooth running systen~. I~~corporating any state of the art QoS 
rr~eclia~iisms i  possible, it is however beyond the scope of this work. 
5 Conclusions 
We have designed and i~rlple~ne~lted a process-specific n~eclianisn~ to corltairl 
u~itrusted objects. We restrict the e11viro11111ent hat sucli objects can operate 
in, and the resources they caIl access, by extending the UNIX security ~riodel 
to  assign sub-user id's to  them and the11 treating them like regular user. The 
i~nplenie~ltatio~~ s part of the kernel of the operating system, since that is the 
only natural and secure place for security ~rlechanisrrls to enforce policies. SubOS 
is a worki~ig prototype i~nplerrlerited as part of the OperiBSD operatirig system. 
Finally, we have shown how SubOS relates to other security ~rlechanis~r~ and 
how it strengthe~ls UNIX security. 
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